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THE ATTORNEY AND HIS CLIENT'S PRIVILEGES*
A not uncommon factual pattern has recently generated a series of federal
cases 1 concerned with the issue of whether an attorney may claim his client's
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Typically, a taxpayer, hav-
ing learned of a pending income tax investigation, secures representation by
an attorney. Thereafter, the taxpayer sends the attorney some or all of his
relevant financial records, including "work papers" prepared by an accountant.
The Internal Revenue Service then summons the attorney to produce all
documents in his possession relating to his client's tax liability. The attorney
refuses to produce them on two grounds: the documents demanded are within
the attorney-client privilege 2 and, if produced, they will incriminate his client.
The last two times this factual situation was considered in the Courts of
Appeal - Bouschor v. United States 3 and United States v. Judson4 - con-
tradictory decisions resulted.5 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits agreed that the
attorney-client privilege was insufficient to protect all the demanded documents.0
Both courts, moreover, assumed that, had the client been in possession of the
documents, he could have refused to produce them on the ground that the
documents would have incriminated him.7 The courts divided, however, on
*United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
1. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Bouschor v. United States,
316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) ; Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956) ;
United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (LD. Ga. 1955); In re Blumenberg, 191 F.
Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal
disnnissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959) ; In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961).
2. The attorney-client privilege was not asserted in United States v. Boccuto, supra
note 1, and In re Fahey, supra note 1. In other cases involving the same factual pattern,
the attorney has claimed the attorney-client privilege but not asserted his client's fifth
amendment privilege. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963); Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 1006 (1956).
3. 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
4. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
5. The Judson court said that Bouschor could be distinguished on the basis of certain
factual differences. But the court admitted that the Bouschor opinion had not considered
these circumstances when deciding the fifth amendment question and stated that it could
not agree with the conclusions reached in Bouschor. 322 F.2d at 466. Given the way each
court analyzed the facts before it, the two holdings are in conflict.
6. 316 F.2d at 456-57; 322 F.2d at 462-63. The Ninth Circuit upheld the attorney-
client privilege for the accountant's work papers but denied it for the taxpayer's cancelled
checks and bank statements.
Actually the IRS could most likely have secured copies of the checks and bank state-
ments from the client's banks. See Bailin, Banks Ordinarily Cooperate uith IRS in Tax
Examinations of Customers, 14 J. TAxATioN 220 (1961).
7. Bouschor did not state this explicitly; Judson did. 322 F.2d at 463. In neither case
did the government attempt to argue on appeal that the client had no fifth amendment
privilege. Brief for Appellee, Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963);
Brief for Appellant, United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d (9th Cir. 1963). The government
might have argued in Bouschor that the client had waived his privilege prior to the attor-
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the issue of whether the attorney could invoke his client's fifth amendment
privilege.
The Eighth Circuit, in Bouschor, relied 8 upon the'Supreme Court's opinion
in Hale v. Henkel9
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incrimi-
nate himself is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never
intended to permit him to plead the fact that some third person might
be incriminated by his testimony, even though he were the agent of
such person.' 0
Underlying this statement in Hale was the realization that to allow persons
other than the one who might be incriminated to withhold information could
cripple investigatory and prosecutory proceedings.
A privilege so extensive [one invocable by third parties] might be used
to put a stop to the examination of every witness who was called upon
to testify before the grand jury with regard to the doings or business
of his principal .... 11
The Bouschor court readily concluded that the Hale rule was controlling even
where the claiming party was the attorney of the potentially incriminated
party.J 2 Nor was this application of Hale without precedent. Virtually every
federal court that had considered the problem had held, on the authority of
Hale, that an attorney cannot invoke his client's fifth amendment privilege.1'
ney's receipt of the documents. See note 60 infra. The government might have argued in
Judson that the cancelled checks and bank statements were "required records" (required
by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 6001 and 26 C.F.R. § 1.6001-1 (1961)] and therefore not
within the client's fifth amendment privilege by virtue of the required records doctrine of
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32-35 (1948). The applicability and scope of the
Shapiro doctrine in the area of taxation has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court.
See generally Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Againist
Self-Incrimnhation, 18 U. Cli. L. REv. 687 (1951); Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 394, 400-02
(1964).
8. 316 F2d at 458.
9. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
10. 201 U.S. at 69-70. This principle has been most recently affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, rehearing denied, 341 U.S. 912 (1951):
"a refusal to answer cannot be justified by a desire to protect others from punishment...."
340 U.S. at 371.
11. 201 U.S. at 70. In addition to this sound policy base, the Hale rule is a faithful
reading of the language of the fifth amendment: "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ." U.S. ConsT., amend. V (emphasis
added). The amendment does not grant a privilege against being compelled to be a wit-
ness against another.
12. 316 F.2d at 459. While Hale did not itself involve an attorney-client situation,
Hale did say that there were cases holding that an attorney could not raise his client's fifth
amendment privilege. 201 U.S. at 70.
13. Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439, 447 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S, 822
(1949); In re Brumbaugh, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9521 (S.D. Cal. 1962); United States
v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D.N.J.), appeal disnissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959) ;
Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277, 285 (9th Cir. 1953) (dictum), vacated on other
grounds, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), re-affirmed, 222 F.2d 720 (1955), vacated on other grounds,
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But the Bouscher result presents every client with a set of unsatisfactory
choices. He can choose to withhold all incriminating documents from his at-
torney and suffer a resultant decrease in the effectiveness of his attorney's
services. Or, he can give the documents to his attorney, accept the consequent
inconvenience and inefficiency of having to remain in his attorney's presence
whenever he is working with the documents or using them at hearings, and
thereby preserve his fifth amendment privilege. Or, the client can give the
documents to the attorney, not follow him around, and abandon his fifth
amendment privilege entirely.
Recognizing the client's predicament, the Ninth Circuit, in Judson, repu-
diated the Bouschor result.' 4 The Judson court refused to accept the anomaly
that
the taxpayer walked into his attorney's office unquestionably shielded
with the Amendment's protection and walked out with something less ....
The taxpayer's only recourse would be... marathon footwork.. ..
To free the client from his dilemma, the Judson court held, as a matter of con-
stitutional law, that an attorney can invoke his client's fifth amendment privi-
lege:
[T]he inherent power thus to compel indirectly an individual's [the
client's] self-incrimination is curbed by the Fifth Amendment as effec-
tively as the power to compel the same result directly.'0
The Judson result - which eliminates the client's dilemma by allowing the
documents to remain privileged in the hands of the attorney - seems emi-
nently sensible. But the constitutional rationale utilized by the Judson court
to support that result is quite unsatisfactory.
The Judson court had to avoid the force of a great deal of case law; its
attempts to do so, however, are unconvincing. The court tried to by-pass
Hale v. Henkel' 7 by classifying it as merely one in a line of cases that de-
veloped the doctrine that a corporation has no fifth amendment privilege.'
8
350 U.S. 377 (1956); United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 368 (M.D. Ga. 1955)
(dictum); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing & Supply Co, 19 F.R.D. 334,
340-41 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (dictum); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1961). The
Sixth Circuit has more recently followed the holdings of Fahey and Bouichor in United
States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964). Contra,
Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Colton v. United States, 306
F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962) (dictum), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
14. 322 F.2d at 466.
15. Ibid.
16. 322 F.2d at 468.
17. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See text at notes 8-13 supra.
18. 322 F.2d at 463-64. The Judson court reached this conclusion by grouping Hale
with United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), and then focusing its attention on the
latter case. This grouping of Hale and White is inaccurate. In White, X sought to with-
hold documents which incriminated X himself; in Hale, X sought to withhold documents
which incriminated Y. In Hale the Court said X could not protect Y, and stopped right
there - never reaching the issue of the nature of the documents and the character of X's
possession, which were the main concerns of the White case and the ones upon which
.udson focused.
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But this interpretation of Hale is not a fair reading of the case. The Hale
decision specifically stated that its holding that a witness cannot invoke the
fifth amendment privilege of a third party was independent of the fact that
the third party happened to be a corporation.'" The Ninth Circuit's treatment
of the lower federal court cases 20 is no more satisfactory than its attempt
to evade Hale. The bulk of these cases held not only that the attorney could
not invoke his client's fifth amendment privilege, but also that the client
had no privilege.21 Judson seized on this fact and attempted to distinguish
the cases by asserting that their statements about the attorney's inability to
invoke his client's privilege were not "essential to the results reached therein. "2
An explicit holding, however, is not reduced to dicta merely because there is
a second holding in the same case which could equally well have justified the
result. Any labelling of either holding as non-essential is an arbitrary choice ;23
19. A privilege so extensive [one invocable by third parties] might be used to put a
stop to the examination of every witness who was called upon to testify before the
grand jury with regard to the doings or business of his principal, whether such
principal were an individual or a corporation. The question whether a corporation
is a 'person" within the meaning of this Amendment really does not arise ....
The Amendment is limited to a person who shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, and if he cannot set up the privilege of a third
person, he certainly cannot set up the privilege of a corporation.
201 U.S. at 69-70 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Hale principle has been applied by the Supreme Court where the one
whom the third party sought to protect was in fact a person and not a corporation. Rogers
v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371, rehearing denied, 341 U.S. 912 (1951).
20. 322 F.2d at 464-66. These cases are cited in note 13 supra.
21. In three cases some defect in the possession of the documents by the attorney or the
client was held to have invalidated the client's fifth amendment privilege. In re Fahey, 300
F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1961); Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277, 285 (9th Cir.
1953), vacated on other grounds, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), reaffirmed, 222 F.2d 720 (1955),
vacated on other grounds, 350 U.S. 377 (1956) ; United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp.
886, 889-90 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959). See also note 64
infra. In one case the client was held to have waived his privilege by taking the witness
stand regarding the documents sought. Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439, 446 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 822 (1949). And in another case the court held that the docu-
ments sought fell within the required records exception to the privilege against self-in-
crimination. United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 368-69 (M.D. Ga. 1955). See also
note 7 supra.
In addition, the .udson court evaded Sears Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing
Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1956), by pointing out that the attorney asserting
the privileges was not in fact the attorney of the privilege holder. 322 F.2d at 465. How-
ever, the Sears Roebuck court said the result would be no different even if the privilege
asserter had been the privilege holder's attorney. 19 F.R.D. at 341. Finally, the ludson
majority simply ignored In re Brumbaugh, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9521 (S.D. Cal. 1962),
which was cited both in the dissent, 322 F.2d at 471-72, and in the government's brief. Brief
for Appellant, pp. 16, 22, United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
22. 322 F.2d at 464.
23. The Hale case shows that neither order of decision is logically compelled; before
asking whether the corporation had a fifth amendment privilege, the court held that a third
party could not invoke that privilege. See note 19 supra.
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the Judson technique could just as easily be used to reach the opposite con-
clusion - that the statements concerning the existence of the client's privi-
lege were non-essential.2 4
Furthermore, the Judson decision failed to explain adequately in terms of
fifth amendment policy why the client's privilege should be extended to his
attorney and not to his other agents. If the purpose of the fifth amendment
is to protect the incriminated person (the client) from torture or more subtle
kinds of abusive questioning, then there is no reason to allow the attorney
to withhold his client's incriminating documents. On the other hand, if the
purpose of the fifth amendment is to guarantee a "fair fight" between the
government and the individual or, as suggested in Judson,2 to force the prose-
cutor to search for "independent evidence," then there may be an argument
for extending the client's privilege to his attorney on the theory that the at-
torney plays an integral role in the client's "fight" against the government.
But many of the client's agents may be important participants in his defense
- for example, an accountant may bear the major burden in the defense of
a tax evasion case. Distinguishing on the basis of fifth amendment policy
between an attorney and other agents of the client would be a difficult, if
not impossible, task. If such a distinction cannot be made, either Hale's hold-
ing that agents cannot invoke the fifth amendment privilege of their prin-
cipals 26 must be overruled, or a purely arbitrary exception to Hale must
be made.
Finally, the Judson court did not consider thoroughly the availability of
nonconstitutional rationales for its decision. If such alternative rationales
exist, the Judson decision may be criticized for failing to avoid the constitu-
tional issue raised by the attorney's claim of his client's fifth amendment
privilege. The doctrine of avoidance of unnecessary constitutional issues is
designed to prevent a court from making important and delicate constitu-
tional adjudications until the experience and knowledge necessary for well-
informed, considered decisions have been accumulated. A constitutional de-
cision is the least flexible kind of decision that can be made; it cannot be
changed by a legislature and is not readily modified or overruled by a court.
The force of the avoidance doctrine seems amply demonstrated by the Judson
case. The Ninth Circuit's use of a constitutional theory raises a number of
problems the impact and difficulty of which are not reflected in the holding
and reasoning of the opinion. Can an attorney withhold documents incriminat-
ing his client if they are received from a third party who could not himself
24. Judson has not been followed by any court, even though its result seems quite
sensi'ble. It was distinguished in a different fact situation in State v. Olwell, 394 P2d 631
(Wash. 1964). On the other hand, law review comment has been favorable. See, e.g, Note,
1964 Dux L.J. 362, 366-68; Note, 49 IowA L. REv. 967, 976 (1964) ; Note, 42 TEXAs L
REv. 553, 557 (1964) ; Note, 38 Ti.. L. R-v. 206, 207 (1963).
25. 322 F2d at 466.
26. 201 U.S. at 69-70.
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have withheld them ?27 Can an attorney withhold documents incriminating
his client if he has received them outside the attorney-client relationshipF?8
Can an attorney refuse to answer questions regarding the nature of his services
for the client if the answers incriminate the client? 29 Besides the problem of
the circumstances under which an attorney can invoke his client's privilege, 0
further questions arise. If the attorney can invoke his client's fifth amendment
privilege, can he also waive it by producing the demanded documents even
though the client protests? Must the attorney prove actual authorization from
his principal before claiming the principal's privilege ?31 Can the client, when
questioned at trial, answer that not he, but his attorney, invoked the privilege
and thereby avoid the damaging inferences frequently drawn from a claim
of the privilege ?32
This thicket of constitutional questions might have been avoided had the
Judson court sought an alternative basis for its holding. Underlying the pre-
dicament created by the Bouschor decision and the constitutional reaction of
Judson to it is the problem of the effectiveness of the attorney-client relation-
ship. Indeed, in Judson the Ninth Circuit explicitly acknowledged its concern
for this relationship.
No other "third party," nor "agent," nor "representative" stands in
such a unique relationship between the accused and the judicial process
as does his attorney.... The attorney and his client are so identical with
respect to the function of evidence and to the proceedings which call
for its protection that any distinction is mere sophistry.33
27. As long as the third party held the documents, the client could not prevent their
production. "A party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its produc-
tion!' Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
28. See, e.g., Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913) (package of client's in-
criminating documents remaining unopened in attorney's safe).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F2d 280 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup.
Ct. 1883 (1964).
30. The Judson decision contains little in the way of qualification which might restrict
its application to the facts before the court. The only prerequisite to the attorney's right to
raise his client's fifth amendment privilege - "if the client himself could have successfully
raised it' (322 F.2d at 467) - really says nothing. Anytime an attorney possesses a doct-
ment or information which incriminates his client, it is by definition true that the client
could have withheld it - if he had possessed it. Factual questions, such as whether or
not the client ever did in fact possess the document or information and how and from
whom the attorney did it fact receive the document or information, were not explicitly
considered in .Tudson.
31. The .udson court stated that the attorney would be presumed to know his client's
desires, but it also noted that there was ample evidence that the client did desire the at-
torney to invoke his privilege. 322 F2d at 467. Yet surely the court did not mean to
require such evidence in every case; for to do so would be to put the client right back in
the Bouschor predicament.
32. Furthermore, a prior claim of the fifth amendment may be used to impeach a wit-
ness whose later answers are inconsistent with that claim. In Grunewald v, United States,
353 U.S. 391, 415-24 (1957), evidence that the witness had claimed the privilege was in-
admissible, but it was pointed out that had his later answers been inconsistent with that
claim, the evidence would have been admissible.
33. 322 F.2d at 467 (emphasis added).
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If the concern in Judson is the attorney-client relationship, then the court
might have looked to the attorney-client privilege for a nonconstitutional
rationale for its result.34 This privilege is a particularly appropriate source
of law in the Judson situation because it is the long established common la,
doctrine designed to deal with precisely the problem of what special consid-
erations the law ought to accord the unique relationship between attorney
and client. The fifth amendment, on the other hand, is a broadly drawn con-
stitutional privilege which is not especially geared to the peculiarities of the
attorney-client relationship.
The attorney-client privilege was developed at common law 5 for the pur-
pose of encouraging full disclosure by the client to his attorney.' The privi-
lege protects the attorney from having to disclose confidential communica-
tions made by his client in the course of seeking legal advice3 T The courts
exclude from the privilege the following kinds of communications because
they are not required by its purpose: communications not made in the course
of a professional attorney-client relationship, communications not made in
34. Or, for a more appropriate constitutional rationale, the Judson court might have
looked to sixth amendment "right to counseL" An argument for protecting the relationship
might begin with Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denmied, 342
U.S. 926 (1952), and cases cited therein, holding that the sixth amendment guarantees the
right of "private consultation" with an attorney.
35. In many states the privilege has been embodied in statutes; however, these statutes
have generally been interpreted as merely giving statutory recognition to the common law
privilege. 8 WiGmop.E, EvrDENcE § 2292; (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as WiGo OE] ; Note, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 240-41 (1961). There seems to be some ques-
tion whether the attorney-client privilege applicable in federal courts is one of state law
or federal law. Compare Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), with Colton v.
United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963). See
generally Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 320 (1964); Louisell, Confldentlialilty, Conformity ard
Confision: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101 (1956).
36. The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between client
and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of
justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice,
which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the con-
sequences or the apprehension of disclosure.
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888), decree made absolute, 131 U.S. 403 (1889).
See generally 8 WiGuoRE § 2291; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 210, comment a (1942).
Although the encouragement of full disclosure is clearly the majority view of the policy
of the privilege, it has been questioned whether the privilege really promotes this policy.
See, e.g., Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between La yer and
Client, 16 CAIn. L. REv. 487, 491-92 (1928). Other purposes for the privilege have been
suggested. Gardner, A Re-evaltation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pts. 1-2), 8 V..
L. REv. 279, 308, 316, 511-19 (1963) (regard for human dignity and inviolate personality) ;
McCoascx, LAw oF EvIDENCE 182 (1954) (deference to strong sentiment of loyalty at-
tached to attorney-client relationship); Radin, supra at 492-97 (protection of attorney's
professional duty of fidelity to client). In the early history of the privilege its purpose
seems to have been to protect the attorney's oath and honor. 8 VIMoan § 2290.
37. See generally 8 WIGMORE §§ 2294-2329. The privilege also protects the client from
having to disclose confidential communications from his attorney.
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confidence, and communications not from the client, but rather from some
third party.88
The attorney-client privilege was considered by the Judson and Bouschor
courts, but it was denied in both cases. 30 The reason for the denial of the
privilege was that the information communicated was contained in documents.
Indeed, in most of the recent cases in which the issue of whether an attorney
can invoke his client's fifth amendment privilege has been reached by denying
(or not considering) the attorney-client privilege, documentary information
has been involved.40 If the clients in these cases had orally communicated self-
incriminating information to the attorney, there would have been no doubt
that the attorney could withhold that information. The fact that the infor-
mation was of an incriminating nature would never have been relevant be-
cause the attorney-client privilege affords automatic protection for all infor-
mation orally communicated in confidence.
The barrier to the application of the attorney-client privilege in cases in-
volving documents has been an exception to the privilege known as the "pre-
existing document" rule. a4 This rule excludes from the privilege documents
created prior to the attorney-client relationship or documents created during
that relationship but not intended to be confidential communications. The
basis of this exception is the fear that if documents could be withheld by an
attorney just as orally-communicated information can be, then, merely by
handing his documents to his attorney, the client could shield any or all docu-
ments - even those which were not protected by any privilege while in his
own hands. The fear that the attorney could become an unwarranted re-
pository for documents is rooted in the assumption that any document once
transmitted under protection of the attorney-client privilege would thereafter
be immune from compulsory production.48 On the other hand, a fact once
communicated orally would still be compellable. If a fact is communicated
orally by a client to his attorney it continues to be accessible to examination.
Although neither attorney nor client may be questioned regarding the privileged
communication per se, the client may always be questioned on the facts behind
38. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947); 8 WiGmoRz § 2317(2); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) ; MoDEL CoDne
OF EVIDENcE rule 210 (1942).
39. See note 6 supra.
40. Cases cited note 13 supra, except Sears Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing &
Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1956) ; and United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964).
41. See generally 8 WIGMORE § 2307; 58 Am. Ju. Witnesses § 501 (1948).
42. Ibid.
43. That this assumption is embodied in the pre-existing document rule is clear
enough. The reason behind the assumption, however, is never stated, The reason developed
hereafter in the text seems the most plausible. One alternative reason, however, might be
a belief that a document could not be compelled from the client after transfer simply be-
cause he would no longer have it. But this ignores the fact that the client, as principal,
could be forced to order return of the document from his attorney, as agent,
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the communication." For example, the client may not be asked the question:
"What did you tell your attorney about the amount claimed as a business
expense?" But he may be asked the question: "Did you spend the amount
claimed as a business expense for meals or for travel?" On the other hand,
if a document is transferred from client to attorney, the document itself is
the communication. Consequently, were the attorney-client privilege applicable,
production of the document could not be compelled although the client might
be questioned on the facts within it. Since the data contained in the document
would likely be extensive and complicated, examination of the client would be
infeasible. For example, questioning the client about the contents of a detailed
contract or about financial records covering several years would be theoretically
possible, but in practice such questioning would be of little value; the document
itself would have to be available for its factual contents to be ascertained.
The refusal in Judson and Bouschor to honor the claim of attorney-client
privilege was the result of a mechanical application of the pre-existing docu-
ment exception 45 without a considered analysis of the policy of that exception.
Judson, for example, disposed of the attorney-client privilege by relying on
the familiar and facile formulation of the pre-existing document rule that a
transfer of documents cannot be a communication 40 The genesis of this forniu-
lation of the exception is traceable probably to a desire to frame the exception
in terms of the doctrinal language of the privilege, which grants protection to
all confidential communications. But the conclusionary language of the courts
notwithstanding, the transfer of a pre-existing document is no less a communi-
cation than the verbal rendition of facts which took place five years earlier
at a time when their legal consequences were not contemplated. To deny that
a pre-existing document can be a communication is arbitrarily to deny pro-
tection to a great deal of important information which can be adequately ex-
pressed and retained only in documents.
Because of their lack of analysis, both Judson and Bouschor drew the pre-
existing document exception more broadly than its policy warrants. The danger
that application of the attorney-client privilege to documents might allow the
attorney to be used as a repository does not lead inescapably to the conclusion
that all pre-existing documents are outside the scope of the privilege. If a
client possesses a document privileged while in his own hands - privileged
by virtue of the fifth amendment, by the physician-patient privilege, or by
any other privilege operational within the jurisdiction - no additional pro-
tection would result from allowing the attorney to withhold this document
44. If the client could be questioned regarding the communication itself, the entire
attorney-client privilege would be emasculated; if the client could not be questioned on
the facts behind the communication, all parties to both civil and criminal litigation could
immunize themselves from ever being compelled to testify about anything simply by rect-
ing all relevant facts to their attorneys.
45. 316 F.2d at 457; 322 F.2d at 463.
46. For other instances of this formulation of the pre-existing document rule, see
In re Blumenberg, 191 F. Supp. 904, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ; Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74, 79 (1913) ; United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365, 363 (ALD. Ga. 1955).
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because the client himself could withhold it. There is no possibility that transfer
to the attorney could create a haven for the document, and the evil sought
to be prevented by the pre-existing document rule is not present. Just as im-
portant, the invocation of a broad exception encompassing documents privi-
leged when in the client's hands contradicts the very purpose of the attorney-
client privilege - the encouragement of full disclosure between attorney and
client. Application of the exception to documents privileged in the client's
possession may again force the client to choose between denying the attorney
full access to relevant documents and preserving intact their privileged status;
whereas applying the pre-existing document exception to only those documents
which are not subject to a prior privilege would not discourage disclosure
because the client himself would have to produce them on demand. In sum the
rationale of the documentary exception to the attorney-client privilege dictates
that the client's prior privileges be preserved, but not augmented, in communi-
cation with his attorney.
If the pre-existing document exception is limited to papers not subject to
a prior privilege in the hands of the client, the rule will not afford documents
greater protection from examination than is now given to oral communications,
Although a client may be examined on facts verbally communicated to his
attorney, he will always be able to invoke any personal privilege which is ap-
plicable to the facts in question. For example, when a client, sued on a promis-
sory note, has told his attorney that he paid the debt with a forged check, not
only is the communication itself privileged but he may refuse also to answer
questions relating to his purported payment to the extent that he can claim
his privilege against self-incrimination. Granting the protection of the attorney-
client privilege to those transmitted documents which were the subject of a
prior privilege will, therefore, only result in a parity of treatment between
written and oral communications. In each case the facts privileged before com-
munication will remain inviolate, while those not subject to a prior privilege
will have to be disclosed - either because the document remains within the
pre-existing document rule or because the client may be questioned directly
on those facts.
Nor does the sparse case law in this area preclude the view that documents
subject to a prior privilege should be protected by the attorney-client privilege
after their transmission to counsel. The Bouscher decision cited a number of
cases 47 to support its denial of the attorney-client privilege; but although
some contained sweeping dicta to the effect that all pre-existing documents
are outside the privilege because they are not communications, in all but one 48
47. Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Brown v. St. Paul Ry.,
241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954); In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
ard sub nom. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 951 (1963) (also cited in Judson, 322 F.2d at 463) ; Falsone v. United States, 205
F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); Grant v. United States, 227 U.S.
74 (1913).
48. Application of House, supra note 47. There is one other recent case, not cited by
Bouschor, which did apply the pre-existing document rule in the face of a valid prior
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of the cited cases no valid prior privilege existed.4 9 And the one case that did
apply the pre-existing document rule in the face of the valid prior privilege
gave no reasons and cited no authority for its derision. 0 Moreover, Bouschcr
ignored the frequent dicta in these and other cases indicating that, if the client
had possessed a valid privilege prior to the transmission, then the attorney
could have withheld the documents.51
In addition to applying the pre-existing document rule, the Judson and
Bouscher courts stated or implied that other defects existed which were fatal
to the claim of attorney-client privilege. Two of these defects were failures
to meet remaining requirements of the attorney-client privilege - i.e., that
the communication be "from the client" and "confidential.isa- These require-
privilege. In re Blumenberg, 191 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). But Blumenberg merely
stated the pre-existing document rule and cited three cases - none of which involved a
valid claim of a prior privilege. 191 F. Supp. at 905.
In United States v. Willis, 145 F. Supp. 365 (MNLD. Ga. 1955), where the pre-existing
document rule was applied, the client's claim of prior privilege was invalid. Id. at 36S-69.
In In re Brumbaugh, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9521 (S.D. Cal. 1962), the client's claim of
prior privilege may have been valid, but the denial of the attorney-client privilege was
based, not on the pre-existing document rule, but on a lack of requisite confidentiaity.
Id. at 85, 183. (The attorney was to negotiate the documents in commerce after receiving
them. See text at note 58 infra.)
49. In particular, there was no valid prior privilege in the oft-cited Supreme Court
case of Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); the dlientes claim of prior privilege
was denied. Id. at 80.
50. [T]he documents at any time involved were either disclosed to the accountant
or produced by [him] ... prior to their delivery to counsel. Under such circum-
stances, it is obvious that no privilege can subsequently arise.
Application of House, 144 F. Supp. at 97-98.
51. See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963) ; Brown v. St. Paul Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 33, 62 N.NV.2d 683 (1954).
Most of these cases (cited in notes 47 and 48 slpra) have paraphrased or cited 8
WIGmORE § 2307 (or its counterpart in earlier editions). %Vigmore's position is that all
pre-existing documents are outside the attorney-client privilege - that to compel pro-
duction of such a document is not to compel the disclosure of a communication. The
argument has been made in the text that this ban on documents should be limited to those
documents not subject to a prior privilege in the hands of the client and that the attor-
ney-client privilege should include those documents which were subject to a prior privilege.
At first blush, Wigmore (and the cases following him) seem to come to the same result
because he does allow the attorney to withhold any documents his client could withhold.
However, Wigmore's reason for allowing the attorney to withhold is not that the attor-
ney-client privilege warrants protection, but rather that the clients prior privilege con-
tinues to operate through the attorney as his agent.
The attorney is but the agent of the client to hold the deed. If the client is com-
pellable to give up possession, then the attorney is; if the client is not, then the
attorney is not. It is merely a question of possession, and lse attorney is in this
respect like any other agent... [T]he doctrine of agency is ample to justify the
result.
8 WmoMRE § 2307, at 591 (emphasis added).
This theory does not square with Hale, raises the Judson constitutional problem all
over again, and should be rejected.
52. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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ments were developed at common law for oral communications; no corres-
ponding requirements were developed for documents because they were gen-
erally excluded from the privilege by the pre-existing document rule. If pre-
existing documents subject to a prior privilege are to be treated on a parity
with oral communications, they, of course, must meet the requirements of the
attorney-client privilege. Requirements for these documents should, therefore,
be developed by employing analogies to oral communications.
The Eighth Circuit found a significant defect in the fact that "the papers
were prepared by the accountants and not by the taxpayer."0 3 This statement
seems to suggest that information communicated by document must originate
with the client. But clearly a client may orally communicate to his attorney
information gleaned from many sources and the privilege will cover it all;
protection is not limited to the client's original bursts of insight. The court
may have been making an argument that the communication was not "from
the client" because the documents were actually sent to the attorney by the
accountant; but such an argument fails to consider that these documents had
been first prepared and then sent to the attorney at the client's order.04 By
analogy to oral communications, these documents should nevertheless be priv-
ileged because the majority rule for oral communications is that communications
from the client's agents are within the privilege.55
Moreover, the courts in both Judson and Bouscher thought the documents
in question failed to meet the requirement of confidentiality. In order for an
oral communication to be privileged, it must be intended to be confidential. 00
Over the years certain factual patterns surrounding oral communications have
come to be regarded as conclusive evidence that the communication was not
intended to be confidential. Thus courts have found a communication was
not intended to be confidential if there was present at the communication a
third person who was not an agent of either attorney or client01 And the
required confidentiality is lacking if the client communicates to the attorney
information which by its very nature, or by instruction of the client, must
be passed on to third parties or to public officials.0 8 It is important to note,
however, that these factual situations, which are regarded as conclusive evi-
dence that confidentiality was not intended, relate to circumstances existent
at the time and place of communication and not to the prior history of the
communicated matter. The relevant intention is that of the attorney and client
at the time of the communication between them. The oral information a client
gives his attorney in confidence is privileged even if the client received his
53. 316 F2d at 456.
54. Id. at 453.
55. See generally 8 WIGMoRE § 2317(1), especially cases cited at 618-19 n.4; Annot.,
139 A.L.R. 1250 (1942), and cases cited therein.
56. See 8 WIGMORE § 2311.
57. See cases cited in 8 WIGMORE § 2311 n.6.
58. United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1963); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963) ; United States
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Mass. 1950).
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information from some third party who did not intend it to be confidential or
if the client had previously told the information to another party. By analogy,
if the transmission of a document is made to an attorney with the intention
that he not reveal its contents or transmit it to a third party, that communica-
tion should be regarded as made in sufficient confidence to satisfy the attorney-
client privilege even though the document may not have been intended as
confidential when received by the client or may have been viewed previously
by third parties. For this reason, Bouschor's finding that the documents had
been previously viewed by third parties 69 would usually be irrelevant to a
claim of attorney-client privilege.6 0 Judson's statements that the documents
were "negotiable instruments in commerce" and "never confidential from the
time of their creation"6' - presumably meant to imply that the writings were
viewed by many third parties - seem equally off the mark.
A final defect found in Bomscher was that the client did not own the docu-
ments in question.62 Since the pre-existing document rule has excluded most
documents from the privilege, the question of the legal rights a client must
have in a document has not been faced by the courts. It seems obvious that
the client must have had legal possession of the document transferred to the
attorney; otherwise the attorney would be forced to argue the anomaly that
the attorney-client privilege protects illegally obtained documents. But the
Bouscher case went further:
Clearly if the work papers were the property of the accountants in the
sense that they were owned by them and not by the taxpayer or Bouscher
[the attorney], no claim of [attorney-client] privilege could prevail.P
This statement can be read to mean that assertion of the attorney-client priv-
ilege is possible only when absolute ownership of the document has been
established in either the client or the attorney. The court did not attempt to
justify such a requirement and no reason for it seems to exist. Certainly this
59. 316 F.2d at 456.
60. An argument might be made that confidentiality is nevertheless lacking in the
particular Bouschor facts because the third parties who previously viewed the documents
were actually IRS agents - the very persons from whom the attorney later sought to
withhold the documents. But there seems to be no reason why a client could not change
his mind. It is quite possible that he might once show his documents to IRS agents and
later (e.g, after having learned of a tax evasion investigation) decide he did not want the
agents to see the documents and, while of that mind, transmit the documents to his attor-
ney. Also, if an argument against confidentiality is based on a theory that the parties
from whom the documents are being withheld have already seen then, that same argument
would probably entail a conclusion that any fifth amendment privilege with respect to the
documents had also been waived by submitting the documents for the first inspection.
There are fifth amendment cases pointing in the direction that such inspection (if in the
same proceeding) would constitute waiver. Grant v. United States, 291 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.
1961), vacated on other grounds, 369 U.S. 401 (1962); Nicola v. United States, 72 F2d
780 (3d Cir. 1934) ; Glotzbach v. Klavans, 196 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. Va. 1961) ; Hanson v.
United States, 186 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950).
61. 322 F2d at 463.
62. 316 F.2d at 456.
63. Ibid.
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requirement would not promote the basic goal of the privilege; as long as
possession is legal, transmission of documents should be encouraged to pro-
mote full disclosure between lawyer and client. Moreover, the Bousclwr lan-
guage is ambiguous and subject to a less restricting interpretation. The court
may only have been referring to the property requirement of the underlying
fifth amendment privilege.0 The court may have meant that since the client
lacked ownership of the document, there was no valid prior privilege capable
of transmission to the attorney; in this posture the repository danger wotld
exist. Supporting this interpretation is the fact that all but one 15 of the cases
cited 60 for the quoted statement dealt solely with claims of fifth amendment
privilege. And the one case cited which dealt with the attorney-client privilege
- one of the Eighth Circuit's own opinions - cited no authority and gave
no explanation for its ruling. 7
By utilizing the attorney-client privilege to preserve, but not extend, the
client's prior privileges, protection can be achieved in fact situations like that
in Judson without contravening the rule in Hale v. Henkel. The attorney in-
vokes not his client's fifth amendment privilege but rather the attorney-client
privilege. Nor is there any danger that the protection afforded by the attorney-
client privilege will reach beyond the attorney to other agents of the client.
Finally, because the attorney-client privilege is a well-developed common law
doctrine, the many questions 68 raised by Judson's constitutional decision are
far more readily answered. 9
64. Whether ownership or mere legitimate possession is required for the fifth amend-
ment is not entirely clear. The landmark case of United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694
(1944), stated:
The papers and effects which the privilege protects must be the private property of
the person claiming the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal
capacity.
322 U.S. at 609 (emphasis added). White has been interpreted not to require ownership.
Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). But it has elsewhere been
held that ownership is necessary for a fifth amendment claim. United States v. Boccuto,
175 F. Supp. 886, 890 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959). Compare
MODEL CODE OP EVIDENCE rule 206 (1942) denying the privilege if "some other person
or a corporation, or other association has a superior right to the possession of the thing
ordered to be produced.'
Whatever the property requirement of the fifth amendment - be it ownership or sonie
particular kind of possession - it is applicable to the client's property rights in the docu-
ments, not to the attorney's rights therein. For the attorney invokes not the fifth amend-
ment, but the attorney-client privilege.
65. Sale v. United States, 228 F2d 682, 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006
(1956).
66. The others were In re Fahey, 300 F2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961), and United States
v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959).
67. Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d at 686.
68. See text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
69. For example, documents received by the attorney from third parties (other than
the client's agents) or documents received from the client outside the attorney-client re-
lationship would not be within the attorney-client privilege whether they incriminated the
client or not. Likewise, an attorney could not produce over his client's protest documents
within the attorney-client privilege because only the client could waive that privilege.
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